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Virtually 
every aspect of life in North Yemen has 
changed dramatically since 1977, including those 
aspects of Yemeni society which represent con? 
tinuity with the past: tribalism, rural life, and use of qat.1 The 
driving force for change has been economic. By 1975, Yemen 
was caught up in the dramatic developments that affected all 
Arab countries. Rising international oil prices generated enor? 
mous surpluses in the producing countries, enabling them to 
initiate ambitious development plans and forcing them to 
import workers. 
The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was in a good position to 
provide those workers. In the late 1970s, one of the jokes 
around the capital city, Sana', was that Yemen had neither an 
"open door" nor a "closed door" but a "no door" policy with 
its oil-producing neighbors. Ill-defined and sparsely settled 
borders allowed easy movement of Yemeni workers to Saudi 
Arabia and of their remittances and goods back home. 
In addition to geographical proximity, Yemenis enjoyed a 
certain social proximity to the Saudi job market. Until August 
1990, Saudi Arabia allowed Yemenis to live and work in the 
kingdom without visas. Many Yemenis owned businesses in 
Saudi Arabia, while other foreigners were not granted such 
rights. In the early years of the oil boom, many older Yemeni 
migrants found a good market for the skills they had learned 
in Aden when it was a British colony: knowledge of English 
Sheila Carapico teaches international relations at the University ofRichmond and 
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and commercial, domestic or secretarial skills. These advan? 
tages placed Yemenis ahead of their competitors for jobs, at 
least in the years prior to the arrival of highly organized work 
brigades from South Korea and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 
This movement of labor had a phenomenal impact on 
North Yemen. Some Yemeni regions lost up to half their male 
labor force to the Gulf, and the national total may have 
reached as many as 1.23 million. By 1982, remittances reached 
an annual record high of $1.4 billion. It was a time when 
Yemeni citizens, on average, vastly increased their spending 
power.2 Yet the government, unable to effectively tax these 
remittances, was forced to rely on friendly countries for aid to 
meet its basic fiscal commitments. Officially recorded foreign 
aid reached $401 million in 1982, mainly from wealthy Arab 
states and to a lesser extent from multilateral and other 
bilateral donors. 
When the world demand for oil dropped and wealthy coun? 
tries cut back their ambitious programs, Yemeni workers lost 
their jobs and returned home. In early 1990 there were still no 
official figures on the scale of "the return"; officially recorded 
remittances of only $600 million suggested a substantially 
smaller Yemeni workforce abroad.3 
The discovery of oil in North Yemen's eastern desert in 
1984 promised to make up for only some of the losses in 
remittances and foreign aid. Yemen's comparatively large 
population (estimated in 1986 at 9.3 million) meant that oil 
wealth would have to be divided among many more people 
than in the Gulf countries. Still, the domestic political impli? 
cations of Yemeni oil were significant. Government control of 
the oil revenues would make the state an increasingly impor? 
tant actor in the Yemeni economy. While in the past, individ? 
ual Yemenis were rich and the government was poor, by 1990, 
relatively speaking, the situation was reversed. 
These changes affected the lives of virtually every Yemeni 
family over the years 1977-89. We examined the cases of two 
families that occupied very different positions in the old social 
hierarchy. The first is an urban family from the Old City of 
Sana', members of the sayyid strata, reputedly descended 
from the Prophet. The second is a peasant or ra'iyya family 
living in rural Ta'iz. 
Both families had prospered during the short-lived period 
of affluence only to find themselves now unable to maintain 
the same standard of living despite hard work. Lacking the 
economic and political currencies needed in contemporary 
society, by the summer of 1989 they each found themselves in 
a precarious position. These cases show the extent to which 
family fortunes are connected to the national economy, and 
illustrate the replacement of old status rankings by factors 
related to class. Whereas in the old days a Zaydi sayyid family 
related by marriage to the royal family was considered part of 
the pampered Sana'ni "elite" and the Ta'iz family were 
smallholder peasants, both were now self-employed at the 
margins of a national market economy. Neither family possess 
the prerequisites for success or even security in this new 
economy: the right educational certificates, the right political 
connections (or "backing"), and money. 
The household perspective also reminds us that through 
this tumultuous period women in particular held tenaciously 
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to traditional Islamic and cultural values, modified only super? 
ficially by the introduction of new commodities into their 
daily lives. Living by traditional ethical values, however, 
seems more difficult than before. 
In the Heart of the Old City 
The Sana'ni family today includes a relatively young matriar? 
chal figure and widow, Amat al-Kanm, her son 'Abd al- 
Rahman and daughter Khadija, their spouses and 10 young 
children.* 
In Amat al-Karim's eyes, Khadija and 'Abd al-Rahman 
were born into nobility. Though neither rich nor politically 
active, they lived in a fine quarter inside the northern gate of 
old Sana', between a mosque and its garden, just off a main 
street, the markets and a square with a school. 
Amat al-Karim loved her husband, Muhammad, a gentle, 
honest scribe who traced his ancestry directly to the Prophet. 
She was grateful to her parents for the good match, for her 
sister's marriage to a branch of the royal family, and for her 
own modest inheritance of several farming terraces outside 
town. Her son and daughter, toddlers at the time of the 1962 
revolution, grew up proud and pious like their parents. Herself 
able to half read, half recite the Quran, she enrolled them in 
* Names have been changed. While the details of the families' lives are true, general opinions 
expressed were gathered in Yemen atlarge. 
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Yemen: Unification and the Gulf War 
Sheila Carapico 
On May 22,1990, the People's Dem? 
ocratic Republic of Yemen (the 
PDRY, or South Yemen) and the 
Yemen Arab Republic (the YAR, or 
North Yemen) joined to become the 
Republic of Yemen. "A Tale of Two 
Families" reflects the malaise in 
North Yemen on the eve of unifica? 
tion; the situation in the south, since 
the 1986 street battles in Aden, was 
even worse.1 
Unity offered beneficial econo? 
mies of scale in oil, power, adminis? 
trative apparatus and tourism. It 
made political sense, too, reflecting 
the view of most Yemenis that the 
division into separate countries was 
artificial and imposed. 
Formal unification heralded un? 
precedented pluralism and political 
opening. Televised debates in parlia? 
ment, dominated by the former rul? 
ing parties of the YAR and the 
PDRY, the General People's Con? 
gress and the Yemeni Socialist 
Party, exposed bureaucratic corrup? 
tion. Some three dozen new parties, 
of Nasirist, Ba'thi, liberal and reli? 
gious orientations, began publishing 
newspapers and organizing for May 
1992 elections. Sana' University stu? 
dents demonstrated to replace na? 
tional security police with student 
workers as campus guards. Military 
checkpoints virtually disappeared 
from Sana', Aden, and the highway 
between them. In June and July of 
1990, the mood was like that in 
Prague. 
The sudden suspension of Saudi, 
Kuwaiti and Iraqi aid, the embargo 
of Iraqi oil shipments, the collapse of 
tourism and the decline in regional 
commerce cost Yemen nearly $2 bil? 
lion in 1990, although a sudden infu? 
sion of migrants' remittances cush? 
ioned the blow. While ministries 
struggled to pay faculty and health 
workers' salaries previously financed 
from the Gulf, investment plans 
were scaled back, the riyal's value 
dropped, prices rose sharply, and a 
half-million returnees camped out? 
side Sana'. 
Yemen's refusal to join the coali? 
tion caused the deepest rift in Wash? 
ington-Sana' relations since June 
1967, but it also captured US atten? 
tion. US Secretary of State James 
Baker visited Sana' but failed to per? 
suade the government to join the 
US-Saudi axis. President 'Ali 
'Abdallah Salih repeated Yemen's 
condemnation of Iraq's invasion but 
observed that intervention by a mas? 
sive multinational force was liable to 
"destabilize the entire region." 
American dependents, Peace 
Corps, USAID, USIA, their Euro? 
pean counterparts, and business peo? 
ple gradually evacuated Yemen. 
Once the war began, the remaining 
20 US diplomats and marines moved 
into the embassy, and oil industry 
employees stayed off the streets. Ye? 
meni media now carried Baghdad's 
war coverage, along with denuncia? 
tions of Voice of America and the 
BBC. After some demonstrations, 
and then a calm, someone threw gre? 
nades at the Sana' International 
School, there were small explosions 
at several embassies, and the heavily 
fortified US compound came under 
machine-gun fire from a passing car. 
For all its popularity, Yemeni uni? 
fication is anathema to Saudi Ara? 
bia. Although the YAR's more con? 
servative social, economic and 
political system appeared to domi? 
nate the new union, a unified Yemen 
of 13 or 14 million people posed a 
potential military threat, the Saudis 
felt, and its relative freedom of press, 
assembly and participation, includ? 
ing women's participation, could set 
a dangerous example. Riyadh tersely 
congratulated the new republic, but 
covertly subsidized an opposition 
"reform" party of conservative tribes 
and fundamentalists. 
Washington has traditionally 
dealt with North Yemen through Ri? 
yadh.2 Sana' got a modest $30 mil? 
lion or so annually in US develop? 
ment assistance, but the PDRY was 
on the State Department's list of 
"terrorist states." Economic plans of 
the unified state called for freer trade 
and investment, and Soviet influ? 
ence seemed on the wane. When 'Ali 
'Abdallah Salih became the first Ye? 
meni president to visit Washington 
in January 1990, two months after 
being designated to lead the future 
unified state, the Bush administra? 
tion approved $50 million in trade 
credits. YAR ambassador Muhsin 
al-'Aini stayed on in Washington, 
while the PDRY's 'Abdallah al- 
Ashtal remained as the new coun? 
try's UN delegate. 
It was against the backdrop of this 
most important event in its recent 
history that Yemen responded to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Initially 
opinion was divided, but the balance 
shifted after Saddam Hussein, in his 
first major speech of the crisis, de? 
clared that Iraq had been inspired by 
the Yemeni example to pursue Arab 
unity by erasing colonial boundaries, 
and Saudi commentators lambasted 
Sana' for refusing to commit troops 
to the kingdom's defense. The Saudi 
request for US troops to confront 
Iraq prompted extraordinary protest 
demonstrations, and the consensus 
at many qat chews shifted decisively 
against Saudi Arabia. At the same 
time, pro-Saudi elements formed a 
Committee for the Defense of the 
Rights of Kuwait. 
Mindful of both the public mood 
and longer term interest in main? 
taining ties with the West and the 
Gulf, the government declared and 
held to a policy of neutrality. The 
Salih regime condemned the inva? 
sion, hostage-taking and annex? 
ation, but did not support sanctions 
or use-of-force resolutions. UN rep- 
See Carapico, page 47 
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school. By the time of Muhammad's death in 1970, Khadija 
had completed five years and 'Abd al-Rahman had finished 
intermediate school. 
Neither Amat al-Karim nor her neighbors could anticipate 
the fantastic changes of the 1970s, as second-hand affluence 
from the oil boom and continuing upheaval within Yemen 
transformed the world around them. Through this tumultuous 
period, Amat al-Karim and her children held closely to the 
family and religious values she learned as a child, but their 
own choices and the changing environment left them in a very 
different position 25 years after the revolution. Whereas the 
status position of a Sana'ni sayyid previously ranked the 
family among the elite, nowadays it is their economic class 
that situates them socially. 
Amat al-Karim found spouses for her children through the 
network of her aunts and sister. Both literate and demure, 
Khadija was not wanting for suitors. In the end, Amat al- 
Karim accepted as her son-in-law a military man, who was 
often stationed in Cairo during the early years of their mar? 
riage. Because of his frequent travels, Khadija continued to 
live in her mother's home. For her son, Amat al-Karim 
selected from their wide kinship network a bride nicknamed 
Ghafura, who also moved into their crowded house. 
Their house in the old city consisted of three stories. Goats, 
chickens, fodder, fuel and grain were kept on the ground floor. 
Amat al-Karim shared the second story flat, containing a large 
diwan (sitting room), two bedrooms, a traditional bathroom 
and a large ordinary room used for baking, cooking and eating, 
with 'Abd al-Rahman and his family. Khadija and her chil? 
dren occupied the smaller top flat. 
In the late 1970s, the family enjoyed the benefits of Yemen's 
new affluence, although none of them joined the flood of 
workers going to the Gulf. 'Abd al-Rahman, whose educa? 
tional qualifications were rapidly becoming insufficient, had 
become bored with his routine, low-paying government clerk? 
ship. Somewhat idly at first, he began painting Islamic verses 
on colored glass, of the sort commonly embedded in the 
plaster around interior windows and doors in Sana'ni houses. 
With the flurry of new residential construction taking place in 
Sana' at the time, sales were soon so brisk that 'Abd al- 
Rahman matched his government salary and more in his 
afternoons. He rented a neighborhood shopfront and quit his 
government post about a year before his marriage in 1977. 
Through 1980 'Abd al-Rahman scarcely kept track of his 
daily earnings, but often grossed 500-1000 Yemeni rials (YR) 
a day ($111-221).4 Much of the income went toward buying 
appliances. As they became available on the market, the 
family bought a tape recorder, washing machine, refrigerator, 
television and video. They paid gladly for water and electricity 
hookups and purchased better quality meat, qat, household 
items, jewelry and clothing, although their tastes remained 
quite traditional. Their courtyard goats and chickens were 
replaced by milk, eggs and meat purchased from the market. 
Khadija and 'Abd al-Rahman's wife Ghafura turned their 
attention wholeheartedly to motherhood, enjoying almost 
annually the 40 days of festivities and relaxation that follow 
childbirth. They passed their time at home with the children 
or celebrating the marriages and births of others. Khadija bore 
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five children in the first decade of marriage (one of whom 
died); Ghafura had six. The three-story house resonated with 
the sounds of children. 
In 1982, members of the family decided to pool their 
resources (Khadija's bridewealth, savings from the men, cash 
traded in from jewelry, and loans from relatives) to purchase a 
fashionable new one-story house outside the walls of the old 
city. It cost YR 220,000 ($48,888 at the new, lower exchange 
rate). They spent a further YR 50,000 on decoration and a 
Western-style bathroom. The kitchen was a separate open 
room in the courtyard, a more healthful arrangement than in 
their old house. Khadija and a widowed aunt continued to live 
in the increasingly decrepit house in the old city. 
By the summer of 1989, the family retained neither the 
prestige of the old era nor the affluence of the oil-boom years. 
'Abd al-Rahman now earns less than half what he made in the 
peak years. The slowdown in housing construction has meant 
less demand for his religious verses and patriotic designs. The 
devaluation of the Yemeni riyal has increased the cost of his 
paint and glass. Many other necessities and niceties of daily 
life also cost more, and family demands surpass what he brings 
home. Ten-year-old appliances are breaking down, and need 
to be repaired or replaced. 
'Abd al-Rahman's wife and sister now tell him that had he 
stayed in his secure civil service job, he would probably be a 
director by now and that surely a decent position awaits him 
still. He checked into the possibility of returning to the 
government, but learned that his intermediate education 
would gain him only an unskilled, entry-level position and a 
meager salary. The traditional familial ties that yielded good 
marriages in the old city are of limited value now in the world 
of government. In his late 30s, he is the model Sana'ni son, 
In North Yemen. Robert Prochnow 
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husband, brother and father?loving, sober, hard-working 
and pious. Yet the smart Western suits of today's successful 
men are not his style, and his nieces call him old-fashioned. 
Like his old neighbors and friends, he manufactures artifacts 
linked to the lifestyles of an earlier generation. His children 
prefer imported goods. 
Khadija has by now joined her husband in Cairo. They live 
in a fourth-floor, four-room suburban apartment. There is no 
place for her children in overcrowded Egyptian schools. 
Ghafura, for her part, lives with her family in the one-story 
suburban house, now surrounded by workshops, a lumber 
yard, and the smaller houses of recent arrivals from the 
countryside. Both women longingly recall the old days in the 
old city, with its familiar social network and the never-ending 
cycle of afternoon parties for new brides and mothers. They 
both fear that their children are not being taught the proper 
old city manners, respect and piety that they want them to 
have. They are keenly aware of the importance of school 
certificates, yet they remain more concerned about their 
children's moral education. 
In Rural Ta'iz 
Far away from Sana', in a village outside Ta'iz, the Qasir 
family represented the epitome of success. Theirs was an 
extended family in which all except Mustafa, the father, 
resided in the tall stone house in the village and worked in 
agriculture. They worked on lands they owned or rented in a 
sharecropping arrangement (shirka) common in that part of 
28 
Yemen. Like other families with excess labor, they took in 
rented lands to maximize production. 
The grandfather, 'Ali, had spent his youth as a stoker on 
steamships moving from Aden to Southeast Asia, Suez, Eu? 
rope and beyond; he returned to farming after his retirement, 
doing what men do in agriculture in those parts of Yemen? 
the plowing and threshing. Grandmother Sybil worked along? 
side him, and tended to the farm animals. Aziza, their daugh? 
ter-in-law, managed the household; she organized mainte? 
nance tasks such as shopping, cleaning, cooking and fetching 
water, arranged agricultural work, and helped her father-in- 
law decide about expenditures. In the afternoons or during 
agricultural slack-periods, she was a seamstress. In the 1970s, 
Aziza's three sons and three daughters were in school but they 
also helped with cooking, cleaning, fetching water, running 
errands and shopping in the market town, and with agricul? 
tural work. 
Aziza's husband, Mustafa, was in Saudi Arabia, where he 
held down two and sometimes three jobs. As a boy he had lived 
with his father in Aden, where he learned some English, how 
to be a houseboy, cook and servant, and how to read and write 
Arabic. In Saudi Arabia, he worked variously as a construc? 
tion foreman, a cook, a clerk and a shop attendant. To keep 
down costs, he shared living quarters with other Yemeni 
migrants, sent a small remittance to his father each month, 
and scrupulously saved every riyal of the rest. When he 
returned to Yemen after four years away, he brought with him 
luxurious gifts: a fake fur coat for Aziza, a color television, new 
and fashionable ready-made clothes for his children, imitation 
Persian carpets, a washing machine, a butagaz-fueled stove 
Middle East Report ? May^June 1991 
with oven, a blender and other household appliances. He took 
his parents on the pilgrimage to Mecca. The bulk of his 
savings went toward the cost of building a new house, a one- 
story bungalow, for Aziza and their children. 
Mustafa returned to work in Saudi Arabia, but in 1983 he 
lost one job after another. After an extended and fruitless 
search for new work, he returned to Yemen. 
Since then he has drifted from one unsuccessful venture to 
another. At one point, he was unable to repay a bank loan he 
had taken out to start a small restaurant; Aziza sold and 
pawned her jewelry to make the bank payments. It has been 
difficult for Mustafa to settle into business because he now 
needs certificates and permits for everything, and must bribe 
officials to get them. He has become exceedingly discouraged 
about the possibility of earning a decent income honorably. 
He has also become disheartened about his own children, 
especially his sons, who do not appreciate the value of hard 
work, spend more than they earn, and seem ashamed by his 
lowly work and powerlessness. Some call the new generation 
the "Nido generation"?spoiled on the Nido powdered milk 
so plentiful in the affluent 1970s. 
Mustafa's and Aziza's eldest son Hamud works in a civil 
service job in Ta'iz. Like many other village men, he lives in 
town during the week and returns to the village on weekends. 
Nearly 30 years old, father of three, he spends more than he 
earns on his personal habits: smoking cigarettes and chewing 
expensive qat daily. 
Chewing qat has taken on enhanced functions in Yemen in 
the 1980s. Nationally, consumption is on the rise because 
more people?men and women?are chewing daily. Average 
daily chews cost about YR 100 ($10). Together with the cost 
of cigarettes, expenditures on this recreational drug can easily 
exceed a household's income. There is new evidence that some 
men are inadvertently "starving their families" to support 
their qat consumption.5 That fathers like Mustafa, who in an 
earlier era would have reached middle age and been supported 
by their sons, are instead finding themselves covering their 
sons' debts, means that somehow, begrudgingly, they appreci? 
ate the important social function of the qat chew for their 
sons. Yemen is a more complex place now than it was in their 
youth. To get things done in Yemen today, one needs "back? 
ing." Backing assures individuals of jobs, certificates, perqui? 
sites, "justice" and business opportunities. If one does not 
have a tribe to turn to, as is the case for many of the southern 
districts of the country, one creates and reinforces one's 
backing through daily social intercourse around qat 
It is not surprising, then, that Hamud has failed to relieve 
his parents of their burden of work by providing regular cash 
support. His irresponsibility has become the major source of 
conflict in the family, particularly when he runs up large debts 
that he expects his father to pay. Yet everyone knows that his 
irresponsibility is the necessary price of keeping in with 
friends and in the know. Men who do not chew qat are 
stigmatized as miserly, negative and anti-social. 
In 1988 the second son, Salih, a university student, pres? 
sured his parents into coming up with enough money to allow 
him to marry a cousin. When Mustafa and Aziza finally 
acknowledged that it would be impossible, he left for town and 
refused to visit them until a year later, after they had made 
arrangements to finance the marriage. When the marriage 
finally took place in 1989, with an installment brideprice and 
"no frills,,, Salih only complained that things were not good 
enough for his bride and himself. 
Other aspects of family life have changed as well. When 
Aziza and Mustafa moved into their own house, they insisted 
on reducing the amount of rented lands taken in by the 
extended family. They would work on their patrimonial plots, 
but no more. Aziza also looks after six sheep, but no longer 
keeps more demanding animals such as cows. Nor does she 
sew clothes for her daughters and herself; it is more economi? 
cal to buy the cheap imported clothes from Southeast Asia 
which are now available in the village shops, the Turba market 
and Ta'iz town. Aziza and her daughters derive great pleasure 
from their leisure time, something unknown to them a few 
years ago. They spend their afternoons and evenings sitting in 
front of the television, watching Egyptian soap operas or 
Saudi religious programs. 
Aziza worries about her daughters and their future mar? 
riages. She wants them to marry close so that she can keep an 
eye on them, but views the pool of desirable bridegrooms as 
distressingly small. She questions the sincerity and ultimate 
motivation of the youthful converts to religious fundamental? 
ism, and wants her daughters to have nothing to do with 
them. "These religious men say that everything is shameful 
('ayb): we shouldn't go out with uncovered faces, we shouldn't 
educate our daughters. This isn't real religion," she says. Yet, 
as Aziza has seen with her own sons, the current situation 
forces many ambitious young men in the direction of excesses: 
irresponsible financial management, corruption, and 
overconsumption of qatf cigarettes and even alcohol. As she 
puts it, "Life nowadays is unstable." 
As the prosperity and satisfaction of the 1970s gave way to 
the austerity and relative deprivation of the 1980s, a sense of 
frustration and alienation developed. We noticed it especially 
among these women and their friends who, always quick with 
a quip, grew increasingly cynical about the political order. 
Though both families enjoyed the security of home ownership, 
they each now relied mainly on the precarious earnings of one 
man with nothing of material value to pass on to his sons. The 
women worried about this, about the erosion of the moral 
fabric of society, and about the contradictions between what 
they still felt was right and the kinds of action that seemed 
necessary to get ahead. ? 
Footnotes 
1 Qat, or Catha edula Forssk., is a mildly stimulant shrub cultivated in the Yemeni highlands, 
Ethiopia and, it is said, the hilly districts ofIsrael. The fresh leaves of the plant are chewed for 
their euphoric effect. Most Yemeni men and many women chew qat each afternoon in social 
gatherings "where the real work of the country is accomplished an decisions made." See J. 
Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise: The Institutionalized Us  of the Drug Qat in North Yemen 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), and S. Weir, Qat in Yemen: Consumption and 
Social Change (London: British Museum Publications Limited, 1985). 
2 See Cynthia Myntti, "Yemeni Workers Abroad: The Impact on Women," MERIP Reports #124 
(June 1984), for adiscussion f the ffects at the micro-level. 
3 See Sheila Carapico, "Autonomy and Secondhand Oil Dependency of the Yemen Arab 
Republic," Arab Studies Quarterly 10,2 (1988), pp. 193-213. 
4 The exchange rate for the riyal was then artificially high. Until 1983, the Yemeni currency rates 
were stable against the major currencies of the world, at$1=YR 4.5. By 1989 the riyal had been 
devalued to$1=YR 10. 
5 This is contrary to what Weir suggests in her book on qat (pp. 101-108). 
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resentative al-Ashtal became the Se? 
curity Council's most prominent, 
consistent advocate for diplomacy. 
The al-Sauds took this neutrality 
as an affront. They cut aid in August. 
Next, they summarily revoked spe? 
cial residence and working privileges 
for over a million of the Yemenis in 
the kingdom, life-long residents as 
well as short-term sojourners, forc? 
ing the majority to sell what they 
could at distressed prices and head 
south. 
News of the US bombing of a 
Baghdad shelter full of civilians and 
of the ground assault politicized 
Sana' as never before. While the 
Arab League's minority anti-war 
faction met at the Hadda Ramada, 
Tahrir Square overflowed with tens 
of thousands of enraged students and 
expelled migrants. 
In the confluence of these 
events?a new nationalism, sudden 
lifting of political constraints, a war 
jeopardizing national and individual 
well-being, and a leading role at the 
UN?Yemenis and their govern? 
ment feel they have found a political 
voice. Popular slogans against the 
war and the Gulf monarchies have 
helped legitimize a regime which, in 
turn, tried to play a mediating role in 
the Arab League and the Security 
Council. Saudi and US "punish? 
ment" has so far only heightened a 
sense of nationalist self-righteous? 
ness. This will deepen if Yemen and 
other poor Arab states that declined 
to back the war are forced to pay. ? 
Footnotes 
1 For one account, see Fred Halliday, "Moscow's Crisi
Management: The Case of South Yemen," Middle East
Report, #151 (March-April 1988). 
2 After the fall of the shah, the US rushed $100 millioni
arms to Sana' when Saudi Arabia requested weapons to
protect the YAR from the PDRY See New York Times
February 12 and 13, 1979; New York Times, February13,
1979; and Washington P st, December 4, 1986, for article
describing the quid pro quo for Saudi nvolvement in Iran
Contra dealings. The context for these events i discusse
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